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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

kANDALL C.
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Plaintiff & Respondent,
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,

V. DURRELL CHIVERS,

NO. 19296

Defendant & Appellant.

APPELLANT'S

BRIEF

Appeal from a Judgment of the Seventh
District Court, HON. DAVID SAM, Judge.

RGE N. MANGAN
ngan & (;illispie
North 200 East

sevelt, Utah 84066,

Attorney for Respondent.

ALVIN G. NASH
P. o. Box 98
Vernal, Utah 84078,
Attorney for
Appelant.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RANDALL C. LABRUM,
Plaintiff & Respondent,
-vsNo. 19296

V. DURRELL CHIVERS,
Defendant & Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

---------

IN THIS ACTION Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant to
enjoin

from Practicing Chiropractry

and also praying

for damages because of Defendant's breach of a non-competition
covenant in a contract.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
THIS ACTION was heard without a jury before David Sam, District ,Judge, and upon the evidence submitted the Court ruled that
the Non-competition clause of the contract was breached and enfn1ceable against the Defendant and gave a final judgment therefor, as to the amount of damages, the matter was referred to the
Seventh District Court for further determination of the same. From
the Judgment ruling the Non-Competition portion of the contract is
-1-

valid and enforceable and the damage aspect of the judqmenL
was referred to the Seventh District Court for further determination.

From this Judgment Defendant appeals.

Defendant seeks a reversal of the Judgment holding that tr.,
Non-Competition clause of the Contract is valid and enforceai,.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiff brought the action on a

entered into

between Plaintiff and Defendant for the purchase of Defendant',
Chiropractic Office.

The consideration for the purchase was

a payment of a cash price

and the inclusion

j

n the contract

of a provision that Defendant would not engage in the practice
of Chiropractery in Uintah County or operate a Chropractic of'·
in Uintah County for ten years.

Subsequently Plaintiff scld r.

Chiropractic business and Defendant returned to Vernal and opcr·
a Chiropractic office and practice.

Plaintiff iPiated this ac:

praying for damages and seeking to enjoin Defendant from
in the practice of chiropractery in Uintah County.

The Court

entered Judgment holding that the "non-competition" clause of·
Contract was breached and that the same is enforeceable.

Fru'

this Judgment, Defendant appeals.
ARl,UMENT
POINT # 1: The
is

of the Court ruling that the
fina_!. Judgment and the rn!i__t_ter

as to fact and law.
The Judgment of the Court ho ldi nq that the non-competi tici
enant was breached and enforceable against defendant, leavic"

-2-

..

the matter of damages to be further determined is a final judgment
and is separable to the question of damages.

The fact that it can

be enforced against the Defendant immediately puts it in the catego1
nf

ci

1'J ll.

final judgment· Winnovich

33 U. 345;

Brent,

213.

roIN'l'. ti_ 2: The Court failed to consider and
and balance the eauities both as
to fact and law as such
of the non-competition clause of

weigh the facts
to consequences
to the enforcement
the agreement.

The cases and precedents with resptct to
covenants will in certain instances be upheld, they are subject to
certain limitations. In a landmark case on this issue,
Supreme Court observed that " , . an

the U,S.

covenant an-

cillary to the sale of a business is reasonable so as to be enforceable, only if it is necessary to secure the buyer the benef its of the business and
v Anderson, 209

u. s.

wil·l which he purchased." Shawnee

432.

And as a absolute corellary to any

consideration as to whether the Defendant should be enjoined from
openinq a chiropractric office or enaage in the practice of Chiro.
the reasonableness of the resrraint; and pertinent
practer'', is
issues with regard to this auestion relates to the territorial

extent of the restraint; the nature of the business practice
·
the fact to be considered,
involved ; notina these considerations
he court is the precise nature of
and apparently disregar d e d b Y t
the restraint, surely

·

·

a

matter of judicial notice that the

ause of population arowth is
business area of Uintah Coun t Y bec
. was at the time Defendant's business
rnnsiderably different than it
And the reasonablewas sold in 1978.
176 N.C. 462.
, t i's different for different sorts of business.
ness of the restrain
does not involve a retail establishmen1
Surely the present situation
-3-

which was the sul jec1

a 1Aw si it '1b1 ·qu,•ntly.

01

Ir. view of

the serious inq•licati .is sug.1ested in llefendant 's affi.lavi t,

its

effect upon the enforcement of the restrictive covenant with respect to an agreement not to compete should have reouired the
grantino of a new cr._..1. Paul v:
Utah Statte Constitution_,

rkenda11_,

.rt.

123 U. o.27; also

Sec. 9.

CONCLUSION
In considering wheth,>r

Lt woulu enforce the cove ,ant riot to

compete in the agreement which i

the s,,J.ject of tris litiqation

the court compl -te 1 i LJ110red matters of reasonableness
policy and

·thc·c factc.

public

that ought to have been considered. Pert-

inent in this respect it ignored the very extent of the agreement
made sometime in 1978 to extend for a whole period of ten years
and to encompass the whole area of Uintah Co•
facts are viewed in the light of the ph
of the area,

tl . .J further

severe hardship on nefend

ty, sur0ly when these

)menal growtll of popula tinn

·emand of services, it would · mpose
,t and c·

the citizens at l

a

oe to impose

this covenant.
Similarly, evidence also shows that

had largely re-

covered the initial consideration given for the sale, that he

1-.. H

no longer engaged in the practice of chiropractery in the area, .rn<l
in view of these matters, imposition of the covenant served merely
to limit competition in

the area, to restrict Defendant's ability

to practice, deny the puhlic of these services at a time
were needed and when th<

they

Plaintiff was unable to render them

Likewise serious consideration should als .. be q.iven lo the fact
that granting the right to enforce the aoreem.·nt imposes upor µuhlie policy in at least two respects:
-6-

(1)

it by agreement restricts

th" number of chiropracters that can practice in the area indirectly without a showing that the same was a part of the increments and

,Jc)od will which Plaintiff purchase: and (2)

it does in a manner in-

trude upon the policy of the State in licensing the practice of
,'hiropractery and subject to its regulations to allow the practice
of those licensed for such practice anywhere in the state in that

,..

it allows parties by private agreement to restrict the benefit of
that practice and to exclude a practitioner therefrom .
And finally,
1

the matters set forth in Defendant's Affidavit

n support of his motion for a new trial brought forth allegations

that would completely cut the ground under the grounds for which
Plaintiff sought relief in his original suit.

In the liaht of

these allegations and the matters(as set forth in the affidavit)
that Plaintiff had signed a similar non-competition agreement when
he disposed of the business, this fact which was at unknown and
undiscoverable at the time of the trial should have merited a new
trial on the issues, at it was an abuse of discretion, in the face
of these facts,

to deny Defendant's Motion.
RPspectfully

this

/

'

.·-·: .;

Ai.VIN G.

-7-
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